

Reflexivity and Changes in Attitudes and Value Structures

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INTRODUCTION

Max Weber postulated that societies are characterised by religions which have an important influence on the societies' political and economic life (Weber 1989). Ronald Inglehart (1997; 1998, 1) argues that Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, African and Latin American cultural and religious traditions are still powerful in spite of

modernisation. He has argued in his book “Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 societies” that economic, cultural and political shifts are changing people’s values and world views.¹ Inglehart (1997) presents empirical evidence that economic development is linked to changes in values and behaviour. He finds that the most basic shift is towards a secular-rational world view. His study shows that all of the Nordic countries rank very highly in the list of societies with the most postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997, 151).

Within the discipline of sociology, scholars such as Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash have suggested that we live in the time of reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994). Giddens (1991, 2–3), for his part, describes this type of modernity as a post-traditional order. Now we live in a world which he calls “high” or “late” modernity, where our present day world is reflexively constructed. We live in a world of uncertainty and multiple choices. Our future is overshadowed by the risks of ecological catastrophes, the collapse of global economic mechanisms, etc. (see also Beck 1992). This can also be seen in the values of young Europeans in 1990 (*Les Jeunes Européens* 1991, 20).

The active hypothesis of my article here is that the risks of late modernity, such as economic recession, which happened in Finland during 1990s, are changing the attitudes, values and value structures of young people, but these changes are also dependent on education, gender and ideological/religious backgrounds.

My research interest has arisen from a curiosity about certain questions, inspired by a sort of multi-disciplinary approach: How do people's beliefs, concepts of the world, attitudes and values form the "lenses" through which they view the world? How, for example, do age, gender and education effect world views? What other influences on the world views of contemporary young people can we find?² My starting premise in this research has been that everyday world views are socialised into people by their own culture during their childhood. Thus I began my world view research project, in 1975, with field research work in my own home environment, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data from Finland's first generation of suburban children and their parents (Helve 1987; 1991; 1993a; 1995 and 2000).

This article is based on a comparative followup study of attitudes and values which started in 1989 (Helve 1993b; 1993c; 1994; 1996; 1997a; 1997b and 1999). This second study covered 240 young people, age 16–19, who lived in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, and in rural Ostrobothnia in the middle of Finland's west coast (cf. Banks et al. 1991).³ Some of the young people attended upper secondary schools or vocational institutions, and the rest were either employed or officially seeking for employment. In 1992, 70 % of these same young people took part in the next follow-up study. Comparative data were collected again in 1995–1996 among 457 young people living in Helsinki and Ostrobothnia who went to upper secondary schools, vocational institutions and business

colleges. Research methods included interviews, questionnaires, projective tests and attitude measures developed by the Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA 1991). Sources also include international comparative studies (see Appendix 1).

This chapter firstly compares young people's attitudes and values in different European countries and secondly analyses the changes in the values of Finnish young people which have happened during the economic recession in the framework of education, gender and ideological/religious backgrounds (cf. Jowell et al. 1996; Friesl et al. 1993; Young Europeans 1993; The Young Europeans 1997).⁴

SATISFACTION WITH LIFE

A European comparative study (Friesl, Richter and Zulehner 1993) shows that young people's sense of satisfaction with life is linked to their economic situation; the exception here being the Irish, who show a higher level of satisfaction than, e.g., the Western Germans though the latter were more than twice as rich in terms of their per capita GNP in 1991 (Inglehart 1997, 62).⁵ But overall, young people from rich and secure societies such as in Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway are more satisfied with their lives than those living in societies where economic and political life has been

insecure, such as in the former Communist countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Eastern Germany (see Table 1).

Young people's subjective feelings of freedom and their level of influence in matters concerning them are interrelated.⁶ Nordic young people (like their

TABLE 1 Overall satisfaction with life and subjective feeling of freedom: youth and young adults aged 17–30.

Overall satisfaction with life	Mean value	Subjective feeling of freedom	Mean value
Total	7.31	Total	7.11
Denmark	8.29	Finland	7.98
Iceland	7.99	U.S.A.	7.81
Sweden	7.90	Canada	7.72
Netherlands	7.86	Sweden	7.69
Norway	7.85	Norway	7.69
Austria	7.84	Northern Ireland	7.59
Ireland	7.84	Austria	7.54
Canada	7.76	Iceland	7.49
Belgium	7.73	Ireland	7.34
Finland	7.73	Denmark	7.34
U.S.A.	7.66	Great Britain	7.19
Northern Ireland	7.62	Western Germany	7.18
Western Germany	7.41	Czech Republic	7.17
Great Britain	7.40	Slovak Republic	7.17
Italy	7.37	Italy	7.05
Spain	7.19	Lithuania	7.00
Portugal	7.13	Portugal	6.71
Czech Republic	7.04	Latvia	6.69
Slovak Republic	6.94	Spain	6.67
Poland	6.93	Slovenia	6.61

France	6.79	Hungary	6.58
Eastern Germany	6.76	Estonia	6.53
Slovenia	6.72	Eastern Germany	6.53
Hungary	6.40	Poland	6.42
Estonia	6.31		
Lithuania	6.19		
Latvia	5.74		

1 = not happy at all; 10 = very happy (Friesl et al. 1993, 7 and 8).

US and Canadian counterparts) appear to be very content in their individual freedom. They also have a strong confidence in people (Table 1).

Subjective feelings of freedom and satisfaction with life seem to be higher among young people from advanced welfare states than among young people who live in insecure political and economic situations (see also Inglehart 1997, 62–63).

YOUNG PEOPLE AS CITIZENS

The participation of young Europeans in community life is generally poor (see Table 2; cf. Spanring et al., 2001). In the Eurobarometer survey of 1997 nearly every other respondent from the fifteen EU-countries said that he or she did not belong to any organisation or association of any sort whatsoever. Of the organisational options proposed, sport clubs were

the most popular (27.6 %). Sport clubs had the most attraction for young people from Sweden (50.7 %), the Netherlands (50.2 %), Denmark (44.4 %) and Luxembourg (40 %). In a distant second place came religious organisations (8.7 %), followed by youth recreational organisations such as scouting (7.4 %). Religious and church organisations had their strongest popularity among young people in Italy (18.3 %) and the Netherlands (17.6 %), both with over twice the average European rate of participation. Only 4.4 % of all respondents were members of trade unions or political parties. The most active young people in this sense came from Nordic countries: every fourth Swedish young person (25.8 %), and almost as many Danish young people (22.4 %) said that they were members of trade unions or political parties. The Finnish young people were the Nordic exception: only 12 % belonged to these types of organisations. The Eurobarometer showed that the

organisations with the lowest average participation rates among young people in EU countries were human rights movements (1.5 %) and consumer organisations (0.9 %).

The general trend is for young people to join neutral organisations of a general nature (e.g. scouts) rather than those with a more specific purpose such as trade unions, political parties, etc. In general the more educated the young people were, the more active they were in participating in organisations and community life (The Young Europeans 1997). This also explains why young people from the Northern welfare states seem to be more active in community life (see also Helve 1997b, 228–233).

IMPACT OF RECESSION

The deteriorating economic situation in Finland was reflected in young people's more rigid attitudes regarding, for instance, refugees and development aid. Whereas in 1989, during the economic boom, when Finland's GNP per capita was the third highest in the world, every other boy and every fifth girl were of the opinion that development aid should not be increased as long as people in Finland needed help, three years later during the recession (1992) almost every second girl (40 %) and a clear majority of boys (66 %) thought so. Nor have these figures gone back down as the Finnish economy has recov-

TABLE 2 Participation in community life of young Europeans (%)

From the following list, could you tell me which organisations you are a member of or whose activities you participate in?

1. Social welfare or charitable organisations
2. Religious or parish/church organisations
3. Cultural or artistic associations
4. Trade unions or political parties
5. Human rights movements or organisations
6. Organisations for the protection of nature, animals, the environment
7. Youth organisations (scouts, youth clubs, etc.)
8. Consumer organisations
9. Sports clubs, associations
10. Hobby or special interest clubs/associations (collectors, fan clubs, computer clubs, etc.)
11. Other clubs or organisations (SPONTANEOUS)
12. 12. No club or organisation (SPONTANEOUS)

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
B	4.0	2.3	6.1	6.3	2.2	3.7	12.9	0.1	23.5	4.1	3.1	52.9
DK	6.0	5.4	8.5	22.4	3.5	9.0	17.6	1.3	44.4	14.1	3.0	22.8
WD	2.2	7.9	4.2	4.6	2.5	6.7	6.5	1.0	38.8	9.6	6.8	38.2
D	2.0	7.1	4.1	4.4	2.2	6.4	6.2	0.9	35.6	9.7	6.5	41.7
OD	1.0	3.8	3.8	3.5	1.0	5.1	4.8	0.5	22.6	10.3	5.0	56.4
GR	3.5	2.4	5.5	1.5	0.7	4.4	2.9	0.8	15.5	1.8	4.1	64.4
E	3.3	6.4	5.4	2.2	1.0	3.0	8.3	0.2	11.8	2.1	6.1	62.3
F	5.4	3.0	7.7	1.3	0.6	5.0	6.7	1.2	28.2	3.9	3.2	51.0
IRL	4.8	7.1	3.7	3.5	2.5	1.3	11.6	0.5	43.7	7.1	5.3	38.8
I	8.2	18.3	5.8	2.9	0.7	4.8	6.8	1.2	23.1	2.8	2.3	45.6
L	2.7	5.7	6.7	5.3	2.0	7.4	25.8	2.8	40.0	7.1	1.7	33.9
NL	9.5	17.6	4.5	6.1	3.2	11.2	7.9	2.5	50.2	9.1	6.1	23.3
A	4.9	12.1	4.6	5.7	2.7	12.0	9.1	2.9	27.0	7.5	2.4	39.8
P	2.5	8.1	4.9	4.0	0.7	2.5	5.4	0.3	21.1	2.5	1.7	59.6
FIN	5.9	12.1	5.2	12.0	2.2	7.7	11.3	0.3	26.6	15.5	2.8	32.9
S	4.9	13.3	7.9	25.8	4.5	9.2	9.2	2.1	50.7	13.8	3.8	17.8
UK	3.6	7.4	2.1	5.9	2.1	5.6	7.8	0.4	28.0	10.7	1.7	50.1
EU15	4.7	8.7	5.1	4.4	1.5	5.5	7.4	0.9	27.6	6.3	3.9	47.6

B = Belgium; DK = Denmark; WD = West Germany; D = Germany; OD = East Germany; GR = Greece; E = Spain; F = France; IRL = Ireland; I = Italy; L = Luxembourg; NL = Netherlands; A = Austria; P = Portugal; FIN = Finland; S = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; EU15 = mean value in EU countries (The Young Europeans: Eurobarometer 47.2 1997, 21).

ered: in 1995–1996 41 % of girls and 57 % of boys were against increases in development aid as long as there is need in Finland (see Appendix 2, Table 2.1 “Development aid...”).

In 1989 young people (84 % of girls and 73 % of boys) considered the standard of living in Finland to be high enough that the country could afford to take better care of the unemployed and other disadvantaged population groups. This supportive attitude weakened during the recession, but well over half (78 % of girls and 59 % of boys) were still of the same opinion in 1992.

This shows the impact that a decrease in standard of living has on young people’s attitudes. Although in 1995–1996 the majority of the nation’s young people still considered Finland’s standard of living to be high enough that it could take better care of the unemployed and the disadvantaged, the overall figures of support for this initiative had gone down yet again (68 % of girls and 51 % of boys were of this opinion; see Appendix 2, Table 2.2 “Our standard of living...”).

In 1989 most young people (66 % of girls and 77 % of boys) thought that Finland was too

indulgent with regard to people who abuse the social welfare system – the lazy and other “spongers”. The attitudes of the same girls had become more adamant three years later when Finland was in the deepest recession (70 %), whereas the attitudes of the boys had stayed the same (77 %). The most uncompromising attitudes in this respect were found among the young working population. In the comparative study in 1995–96 the girls (69 %) gave still more strict answers regarding those who abuse social welfare than the girls had given in 1989. Instead the attitudes of the boys had become more lenient in 1995–96 (67 %) (see Appendix 2, Table 2.3 “People who take unfair advantage...”).

VALUE STRUCTURES, GENDER, SCHOOLING AND LOCAL DIFFERENCES

According to my findings from the data of 1989–1992, it is possible to divide young people into three different groups with regard to their values, which are “*Humanists*”, “*Individualists*” and “*Traditionalists*” (Helve 1993b; 1994).⁷ In the analysis of the new data from 1995–96 the young people are divided into five value groups.⁸

“*Humanists – Egalitarians*” are those whose values stress gender equality, e.g., in working life. They have no objections to working for a woman boss and in their opinion work is no less important for a woman than for a man. Men and women both need to earn money and take care of the home and the family. In their opinion there should be more

women in leadership and other important jobs and it is very important to live according to one’s conscience. They would not mind if their children went to school where half of the children were of another race (see “*Humanists – Egalitarians*” factor and loadings, Appendix 3, Table 3.1).

“*Traditionalists – Conservatives*” supported such statements as, “Couples who have children should not divorce”, “Marriage is for life”, and “Young people today don’t respect the traditional values enough”. These young people agreed with the opinion, “Our country needs strong leaders who can restore order and discipline and the respect of right values” (see “*Traditionalists – Conservatives*” factor and loadings, Appendix 3, Table 3.2).

“*Environmentalists – Greens*” stressed the opinion that the development of economic welfare should not be taken any further. Nuclear energy should be given up, even if it would result in a decrease in standard of living. They believed that a continued rise in economic well-being only increases mental suffering, and science and technology are beginning to control people instead of serving them. They were willing to lower their standard of living in order to decrease pollution and environmental problems. They also believed that “Even young people can promote world peace by participating in peace work” (see “*Environmentalists – Greens*” factor and loadings, Appendix 3, Table 3.3).

“*Cynics – Political Passives*” agreed with the statements, “Citizens’ opinions don’t have much influence on the decisions made in society”, “The political parties have become estranged from ordinary people and their problems” and “None of

the existing political parties advocate things that are important for me” (see “Cynics – Political Passives” factor and loadings, Appendix 3, Table 3.4).

One significant new group of values was the global (cf. Watson 1997, “Generation Global”). “*Internationalists – Globalists*” thought that if more foreign people came to Finland, these contacts would be mutually beneficial. In their opinion it was not a privilege to be Finnish and “East, west, home is best”, was an obsolete phrase (see “*Internationalists – Globalists*” factor and loadings, Appendix 3, Table 3.5).

In the variance analysis, significant differences in these values of boys and girls were found. Girls more than boys valued environmental issues; secondary school urban girls most of all. Boys valued technology and science more than girls (urban upper secondary school boys in particular). Vocational school urban girls were most politically passive and critical of politics. The most active in politics were urban upper secondary school girls. Business school students valued technology and economic welfare most heavily, whereas secondary school students were most critical of them. Green values were given as an alternative to technological and economic values. On the other end of the spectrum from the “*Internationalists – Globalists*” were “*Racists*,” who were more often boys, the majority of whom studied in vocational or business schools and colleges. Most traditionalist conservative values were found among secondary school boys and most urban girls were against these values. The most humanistic values were found

among secondary school girls (cf. Brown 1996). In general rural young people valued family values more than urban young people. With respect to gender differences girls valued humanism and equality more than boys, who valued technology and economic welfare more.

SOME CRITICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Inglehart’s comparative value study describes the changes in contemporary values using the categorical designations of “materialist” and “postmaterialist” (Inglehart 1977, 27–28; 1990; 1997). He presents a hypothesis of scarcity, according to which people generally consider whatever resources are scarce to be important. Thus people’s basic needs and values reflect the socio-economic situation in society (Inglehart 1977; 1990; 1997). He claims that the postmodern period is connected with the postmaterialist value world, which criticises the modern and materialist value world. My findings indicate that postmaterialist values are to be found among Finnish young people as well. They are found especially among “humanists” supporting gender and racial equality and among international “globalists” with their cosmopolitan value worlds. The “greens” also expressed postmaterialist ideas in criticising the raising of the material standard of living, and in being willing to lower their standard of living in order to eliminate nuclear power (cf. Inglehart 1997, 104).

People's multiple needs, attitudes and values, however, form a more conflictory value world than Inglehart's typology suggests. A person may have very different needs, attitudes and values, a portion of which are materialist and a portion of which are postmaterialist. For example my follow-up study of young people's value systems indicates a decline in postmaterialist values among young people during the recent period of economic recession. Although a portion of young people can be described as humanists, attitudes towards poor people and foreigners became sharper among them as the result of the recession just as they did among the individualists (Helve 1993b). Economic scarcity can thus be seen in the increase in materialistic values. The same young people, however, also valued things other than material goods. Most of these young people were ready to compromise their own standard of living in order to protect, among other things, the environment and help those less fortunate (Helve 1997a and 1999).

According to Inglehart, those who are postmaterialists in their value world are more ready to give economic help to poor countries and they are also more concerned about women's rights (Inglehart 1977, 30). Young people's values are generally postmaterialistic (Inglehart 1977; 1990, 76). Recent research, however, has indicated that traditional attitudes are still wide-spread in modern societies (Inglehart 1990, 3; Vinken and Ester 1992, 411). All of the new national political movements within Europe – with such diverse concerns as environmental issues, peace, human and animal rights, fighting poverty and promoting equal rights

for developing countries and between genders – cannot necessarily be taken as expressions of postmaterialist values. Inglehart's theory oversimplifies this; in the light of my research, the value worlds of young people appear to be far more complex than anything that he describes as part of the category of postmaterialist values.

DISCUSSION

The comparative follow-up study shows that although different value structures can be found, only a few young people clearly belonged to just one category. Because young people are not tied to the values of any given ideology, they choose different values according to the situations in which they find themselves (cf. Bourdieu 1987; Frazer and Nicholson 1991; Lyotard 1984 and 1985). Thus the same young person may be an individualist in some areas, a humanist in others and a racist in others. It is worth asking though, are these young people, with their floating values and their variety of sub-cultures, better adapted to the uncertainty of the "risk society" and changing world than we older folk are (cf. Beck 1992; Giddens 1994 and 1995)? Is it a rational or a reflexive response to postmodern uncertainty?

We are at a historical turning point. The break up of the modernist paradigm of Marxism and centralised economic planning in the former Communist countries have been radical changes. There is, however, also a strong modernist backlash against postmodernism (Jencks 1996, 477). For

example, many physicists do not want to accept the uncertainty principle, chaos theory and other manifestations of postmodern thought.⁹ And yet there are phenomena which lead one to believe that the world is facing a genuine paradigm shift as we begin the new millennium, affected, for example, by ecological crises such as the greenhouse effect. One of the key shifts taking place in the postmodern world is a change in epistemology, the understanding of knowledge (Jencks 1996, 478). It is coming to emphasise the continuity of nature and the developmental nature of science. This does not mean complete scepticism and an end to all master narratives and beliefs (cf. the concept of “metanarrative”, Lyotard 1996, 481–513), but it rather means support for relative absolutism and the idea that propositions of truth are time- and context-sensitive. This, in turn, is bringing about a fundamental change in people’s values.

NOTES

- 1 Ingleharts’s research is a part of the series of World Values surveys which began in 1981, and it is also tied to the Eurobarometer surveys of Commission of the European Union.
- 2 In my doctoral dissertation (Helve 1987; 1993a) I examined the development of the world views of the same group of young people from childhood into adulthood, after which I continued on as a researcher with the Finnish Academy comparing the attitudes and values of 16- and 19-year-old young people from Helsinki with those of the same ages in rural Ostrobothnia (the region around the centre of Finland’s west coast) in the years 1989 and 1992 (Helve 1993b). This has been further expanded as a

project of the Finnish Academy into a study of values and world views, as well as gender ideologies, on the basis of empirical research data collected in the years 1992, 1995, 1996 and 1997 (see Helve 1995; 1996; 1997a; 1999 and 2000).

- 3 The Ostrobothnia is an area which has always had many particularly strong political and religious movements.
- 4 Finland’s per capita GNP in 1989 was the third highest in the world, after Japan and Switzerland, but after that Finland experienced an economic recession and the unemployment rate rose very quickly. The GNP recovered again, and in 1997 it reached higher levels than in 1989–90, but with the difference that unemployment has still remained much higher than ten years ago. Employment has not grown in proportion to GNP per capita.
- 5 Inglehart argues that subjective well-being rises with rising levels of economic development (1997, 62–63).
- 6 According to my data from the 1995–1996 study, the Finnish young people rated individual freedom third in their hierarchies of personal values, alongside peace, after health and close personal relationships.
- 7 The differences in attitudes and values were investigated using factor analysis. From the 19 variables used to measure attitudes, principal components followed by varimax rotation produced a three-factor result in the two phases of the study (see more Helve 1994, 84–90).
- 8 In the factor and variance analysis of the new data from 1995–1996 I tried to get more information about the value systems of young people. In this analysis I enlarged the framework from the original 19 to 31 variables, using more variables than in the previous phases of the study for considering issues of politics, environment, science and technology, economics, nationalism, gender equality, human

rights, participation, work and family values (see also the three-factor analysis Helve 1999, 53–56).

9 Cf. genetic cloning.

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APPENDIX 1

TABLE 1 The phases and methods of the research

1989	Phase 1. 16–19 year olds 123 girls, 117 boys (n = 240)	Methods · Questionnaires · Word association and sentence completion tests · Individual and group focused interviews (video taped) · Attitude scales
1992	Phase 2. Follow-up study 19–22 year olds 93 girls, 72 boys (n = 165)	Methods · Questionnaires · Word association and sentence completion tests · Attitude scales
1995–1996	Phase 3. Comparative study 16–19 year olds 228 female, 229 male (n = 457)	Methods · Questionnaires · Word association and sentence completion tests · Attitude scales

The attitude scales used were taken from the survey of economic, political and social attitudes conducted by the Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA). The study also makes use of direct and projective questions, word association and sentence completion tests and focused interviews which were used in my original longitudinal study of the world views of young people (1993a). This study has followed the same young people, who lived in a suburb of Metropolitan Helsinki, for over 20 years, from their childhood to adulthood.

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 2.1 "Development aid to foreign countries should not be increased as long as there are people in need of help in Finland." Comparison of 1989, 1992 and 1995–1996, %

Year		1989	1992	1995–96
Total	Agree	35.2	51.2	48.5
	Difficult to say	16.7	15.4	19.0
	Disagree	48.1	33.3	32.5
Sex	Agree	Girls	40.2	40.5
		Boys	65.7	57.1
	Difficult to say	Girls	17.4	16.4
		Boys	12.9	21.7
	Disagree	Girls	42.4	43.1
		Boys	21.4	21.2

TABLE 2.2 "Our standard of living is so high that we must have the means to care for the sick and other people who are badly off." Comparison of 1989, 1992 and 1995–1996, %

Year		1989	1992	1995–96
Total	Agree	79.0	69.8	59.8
	Difficult to say	12.4	17.9	27.4
	Disagree	8.6	12.3	12.8
Sex	Agree	Girls	78.3	67.5
		Boys	58.5	51.4
	Difficult to say	Girls	14.1	22.7
		Boys	22.9	32.4
	Disagree	Girls	7.6	9.8
		Boys	18.5	16.2

TABLE 2.3 "People who take unfair advantage of the social services, idlers and spongers are treated far too well."
Comparison of 1989, 1992 and 1995–1996, %

Year			1989	1992	1995–96
Total	Agree		71.2	73.3	67.9
	Difficult to say		20.6	16.8	21.8
	Disagree		8.2	9.9	10.3
Sex	Agree	Girls	66.1	70.4	69.2
		Boys	76.8	77.2	66.5
	Difficult to say	Girls	24.8	17.6	22.8
		Boys	16.1	15.7	20.8
	Disagree	Girls	9.1	12.1	8.0
		Boys	7.1	7.2	12.7

APPENDIX 3. FACTORS AND LOADINGS

TABLE 3.1 Factor 1. Humanism – Egalitarians

	F 1	F 2	F 3	F 4	F 5
I would not want a woman to be my boss	-.62				
It is less important for a woman to go to work than it is for a man	-.60				
A man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to take care of the home and the family	-.58				
It's very important to me to live according to my conscience	.51				
There should be more women bosses in important jobs in business and industry	.51				
I would not mind if my child went to a school where half of the children were of another race	.40				(.39)
There is too much talk about gender equality	-.40				
Saving is an obsolete virtue	-.39				
Everyone should have the freedom to live as one likes	.37				
Individual person's acts have no mentionable effect on the state of nature	-.36				
I am willing to lower my standard of living in order to decrease pollution and environmental problems	.30		(.44)		
The building of a fifth nuclear power plant is to be supported	-.30		(-.40)		
There are situations where military action is allowed, e.g. when a country defends its independence	.30				

TABLE 3.2 Factor 2. Traditionalism – Conservatives

	F 1	F 2	F 3	F 4	F 5
Couples who have children should not divorce		.61			
Marriage is for life		.55			
Young people today don't respect the traditional values enough		.51			
Divorce is too easy to get these days		.50			
Our country needs strong leaders who can restore order and discipline and the respect of right values		.44			

TABLE 3.3 Factor 3. Environmentalism – Greens

	F 1	F 2	F 3	F 4	F 5
Further development of economic welfare should not be carried out			.56		
Nuclear energy should be abandoned even if it would cause a decrease in the standard of living			.54		
The continued development of economic well-being only increases mental ill-being			.53		
Science and technology are beginning to control people instead of serving them			.48		
I am willing to lower my standard of living in order to decrease pollution and environmental problems	(.30)		.44		
Even young people can promote world peace by participating in peace work			.40		
The building of a fifth nuclear power plant is to be supported	(-.30)		-.40		
Economic growth is the only possible basis for continuous social welfare			-.39		
Development aid to foreign countries should not be increased as long as there are people in need of help in Finland			-.35		
We should have more respect for the conviction of a conscientious objector			.32		(.39)
Our standard of living is so high that we must have the means to care for the unemployed, the sick, the disabled and other people who are badly off			.31		

TABLE 3.4 Factor 4. Cynicism – Political Passives

	F 1	F 2	F 3	F 4	F 5
Citizens' opinions don't have much influence on the decisions made in society				.65	

The political parties have become estranged from ordinary people and their problems		.59
None of the existing political parties advocate things that are important for me	.49	

TABLE 3.5 Factor 5. Internationalism – Globalists

	F 1	F 2	F 3	F 4	F 5
If more foreign people came to Finland, we would benefit from useful international influence					.49
It is a privilege to be Finnish					-.46
"East west home is best" is an obsolete phrase					.44
I wouldn't mind if my child went to a school where half of the children were of another race	(.40)				.39
We should have more respect for the conviction of a conscientious objector			(.32)		.39
